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The Origins of a Political Trial: The




According to many accounts,' the Sanctuary Movement first arose in
the United States-Mexico border region in response to a dramatic increase
in the flow of Salvadoran refugees' to the United States in 1980.
Churches responded by providing food, shelter and solace. At the time, all
that most people knew about El Salvador was that its archbishop, Oscar
Romero, had recently been assassinated after appealing to President
Carter to stop sending arms to his country. The refugees, however,
brought eyewitness and personal accounts of death squads roaming their
country and of church and other humanitarian aid workers being tor-
tured. These accounts provided a "traumatic awakening"' for many peo-
ple, a trauma then intensified by the bureaucratic response of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS). Rather than recommending
that refugees receive a temporary haven in the United States until hostili-
ties in El Salvador abated and political conditions stabilized, the INS de-
tained-essentially imprisoned-as many of the new refugees as it could
* I would like to thank Prof. Bob Gordon for encouraging me to believe in this article enough to
submit it for publication, and the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities for accepting it. I am also
very indebted to the Journal's staff for their extensive editorial assistance.
1. See, e.g., MacEoin, A Brief History of the Sanctuary Movement, in Sanctuary: A Resource
Guide for Understanding and Participating in the Central American Refugees' Struggle 14 (G.
MacEoin ed. 1985) [hereinafter Resource Guide].
2. In both United States and international law, "refugee" is a term of art which refers to people
who have a "well-founded fear" that they will face persecution on account of their "race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion" if repatriated. See Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a)(42), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) [hereinafter INA]; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. Collo-
quially, the term refers more generally to persons displaced from the security of their homes, families,
and communities particularly because of military hostilities, political instability, or human rights
abuses. People who have entered the United States without proper visas and whom the INS has not
yet deemed to be "refugees" are called "illegal aliens." To avoid using this latter and pejorative term,
this article will refer to people fleeing instability and human rights abuses in Central America and
claiming to be refugees, whether or not they are aware of the law's technical requirements, as refu-
gees. When "refugee" is used as a term of art, it will be so clarified either specifically or by context.
3. MacEoin, supra note 1.
1
Pirie: The Origins of a Political Trial
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1990
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
arrest and then set about deporting them as fast it could arrange, only
minimally observing their rights to legal counsel and an opportunity to
petition for asylum in the United States.
In contrast to the relief efforts that followed such dramatic events as the
Mexico earthquake and Cuba's 1980 expulsion of political prisoners and
handicapped persons, local involvement did not wither this time. Rather, a
church community had been awakened to two realities: The existence of
widespread human rights abuses in Central America and the U.S. govern-
ment's refusal to harbor people fleeing those atrocities-an interlocking
and "institutionalized process of injustice obviously call[ing] for organized
counter measures. '
4
The Tucson Ecumenical Council and later the Chicago Religious Task
Force on Central America organized the sheltering and hiding of as many
refugees as possible in church basements and "safehouses" in their com-
munities. They also initiated a continuing public proclamation of the reli-
gious motivation of many of the people providing charity and sanctuary to
the refugees. They solicited community-based legal services and immigra-
tion attorneys to assist the refugees to obtain asylum in the United States.
They raised funds to bond refugees out of INS detention centers while.
their asylum claims were pending. Finally, and most significantly for the
political importance of the Sanctuary Movement, the Chicago and Tucson
groups organized the dissemination of the refugees' message and sum-
moned other faith communities and later whole towns, cities, and even
states to consider providing similar charity assistance and sanctuary.
These efforts helped some refugees find a haven in the United States
and avoid deportation back to Central America.5 But they had no discern-
ible ameliorating effect on immigration practices or policies concerning
Central Americans. But this failure does not mean that these efforts were
only significant as stop-gap or band-aid measures. Sanctuary participation
taught people about certain political, religious, and legal realities from
which they formed new perceptions about their world, their responsibility,
and possibilities for action. "Sanctuary" began to carry a double meaning:
It embraced not only sanctuary for those fleeing oppression, but also the
sanctuary of the church as a forum from which to act upon political be-
liefs. Direct confrontation between prophetic witnesses and potential par-
ticipants in intimate but communal surroundings characterized this forum.
Sanctuary work gave rise to the sense of a shared commitment to and
participation in politicized moral activity. It also provided participants
with a sense of belonging to a tradition of empowerment, rather than one
based only in protest or charity.
4. Id.
5. Estimates of the number of refugees "successfully" harbored by the Sanctuary Movement range
from 600 to 3000. Ryan, The Historical Case for Sanctuary, 29 J. Church & St. 209 (1987).
[Vol. 2: 381
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As the Movement spread its relief activities across the country, and pro-
pelled whole cities and some two hundred congregations into offering their
confines as sanctuaries for Central American refugees, it ran increasingly
and flagrantly afoul of United States immigration law which prohibits
harboring "illegal aliens." 6 After first ignoring or dismissing the Move-
ment as an expression of frivolous and misguided piety, the government
became increasingly affronted by how the churches publicized their sanc-
tuary activities. Such publicity became a "trademark of the movement."'7
In response, federal agencies undertook the extended, undercover "So-
journer" investigation that led to the criminal indictment of various of the
Movement's leaders and church workers. As the following pages will ar-
gue, the confrontation between the government and the Movement sug-
gests that the interaction between the Movement's inner dynamics and its
national and international environments had significant implications, not
just for refugees seeking asylum, but crucially for the nature and quality
of political participation in the United States.
Rather than providing a participant-oriented telling of the Sanctuary
story based on purportedly exhaustive, systematic, or statistically sound
research, the following pages seek, on the basis of what facts and stories
are presently known and available, to understand the Sanctuary Move-
ment and its criminalization as a socio-political phenomenon with signifi-
cance for practices of legality, social protest, humanitarian charity, and
communitarianism in the United States. To so analyze the Sanctuary
Movement, it is obviously necessary to "interpret" the various stories told
by the Movement's participants, government actors, the media, and other
observers.
Although the mass media, by its claim to "all the news that's fit to
print," often provides a useful source of information for penetrating a con-
temporary phenomenon like the Sanctuary Movement, the media is
neither the sole creator nor the most accurate reflector of an event's con-
temporary or historical significance. Sometimes the creation of meaning
and the writing of history are done by a political movement's own prac-
tices and self-reflective dialogues. But once one abandons the distilling ho-
mogenization of media sources of fact and interpretation, the problem be-
comes not just penetrating the.stories of and about a phenomenon, but
managing their diversity and multiplicity. Which story of the many consti-
tuting or concerning the Sanctuary Movement is the best one to retell?
Whose viewpoint should inform that selection and retelling? One's inter-
6. See supra note 2.
7. Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy, 21
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 493 (1986). These statements have also been interpreted and promoted as
efforts by Sanctuary participants to bear " 'public witness' to the belief that their actions are morally
and legally justified." See Christie Institute, Information Package on Religious Sanctuary and Rights
of Refugees (Apr. 15, 1985); Godar, The Sanctuary Movement: An Analysis of the Legal and Moral
Questions Involved, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 1221, 1224 (1986).
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pretive purposes or goals can guide selection, but perhaps too teleologi-
cally. Alternatively, a phenomenon's outstanding features may suggest foci
and principles of selection and ordering. The Sanctuary Movement seems
to present such a case.
One finds extraordinary and alarming features in the government's
treatment of the Sanctuary Movement: The legal briefs presented to the
United States Court of Appeals by those convicted in the Tucson Sanctu-
ary Trial, argue, for example, that the defendants were denied their con-
stitutional right. to prepare and present available legal defenses and to
testify on their own behalf, and that they were found guilty after a trial in
which the court allowed no mention of conditions in Central America, the
1980 Refugee Act, or the Geneva Conventions on wartime humanitarian
obligations. The briefs also argued that the trial court allowed the govern-
ment to prove its case with evidence it had obtained by paying spies to
infiltrate the private confines of church meetings and engage in the very
illegal activities for which it was prosecuting the defendants.'
Whether or not such procedures and court rulings were technically le-
gal is not the issue here. Rather, when we see the government and the
courts treating callously and distrustfully people whom even government-
sanctioned popular culture associates with meekness and innocence-nuns
and churchgoers as opposed to "leftist radicals" and burglars-something
seems seriously disturbed in the civic universe which we share with these
people. Our powers of association may trigger memories about a spotty
American tradition of subjecting supposedly treasonous political and social
movements to ordeals of harassment and prosecution-to what I will call
"political trials."
From the point of view of legal procedure, political trials are those
trials in which political motivation rather than legalism drives the decision
to prosecute, in which political considerations affect the outcome, or in
which the participants behave so as to maximize the political conse-
quences of using or appearing before the courts.9 And from the point of
view of substance, political trials concern what Otto Kircheimer calls "Po-
litical Justice"-that is, "justice in political matters"' 0-and involve af-
firming, challenging, or amending an existing or proposed configuration
of political power-what I will call "political justice" writ small.
It is not unusual that the political issues at stake in a political trial
should become or should seek channelling and expression in the legal sys-
tem as an alternative or in addition to the political system. As Alexis de
8. See Brief for Respondents, United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-
1208).
9. See N. Dorsen & L. Friedman, Disorder in the Court, Report of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct 79 (1973), cited in J. Dugard,
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 206 (1978).
10. 0. Kircheimer, Political Justice vii (1961).
[Vol. 2: 381
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Tocqueville wrote, "Scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later into a judicial question."11 Al-
most two hundred years later, Kircheimer argued even more broadly that,
in the modern era, whatever the dominant legal system, both governments
and private groups bring issues about the balance of political power before
the courts, with or without disguise."2
Despite many people's conceptions, political trials are not just peculiar
and extreme phenomenon that occur, like Stalin's show trials, only in for-
eign and totalitarian societies or in response to movements with both revo-
lutionary zeal and revolutionary capacity. Although Judith Shklar has
said-in 1964 and again in 1986-that the United States federal courts
have tried no political trials since World War II, there is something dis-
tinctive and important about the trials faced by Communist Party member
Dennis," the Vietnam War draft resisters, black activist Angela Davis,
and now the Sanctuary workers-something that justifies grouping them
with the trials faced by Nelson Mandela, the leaders of the Prague Spring
of '68, and the post World War I Red Scare targets in the United States.
The distinctiveness of such trials is not only that they usually involve
extraordinary legal procedures-bullied defendants, falsified evidence, or
other deprivations of due process-or that they seek, often quite explicitly,
to engineer political order and correctness for and in the larger commu-
nity. Rather, I will argue, there is a distinctive character to the form, the
amount, or the content of public participation in the phenomenon under-
lying such trials. It is distinctive precisely because the dynamics of that
participation tend to outlast, overpower, or circumvent the resort to the
courts, which often comes to seem irrelevant, futile, or even farcical. As
Shklar has written, "It is not the political trial itself but the situation in
which it takes place and the ends that it serves which matter. It is the
quality of the politics pursued in them that distinguishes [political trials
from other trials and] one political trial from another.' 4 If the courts do
not employ procedures and render judgments affirming or resonant with
deep-seated notions about right, wrong, and fair play, they cannot render
political justice, in the sense of a balancing of political power that will sit
at least tolerably well within the body politic. As the following exploration
of the Sanctuary Movement will show, whether political justice or Politi-
cal Justice is done depends not only on how political foes are defined, but
crucially on how well judicial responses (regulating disturbances caused
by these foes) conform to narrower concepts of justice like "legality"-the
adherence to legitimate, authoritative, and fair rules-ordering polities.
11. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 290 (1960).
12. 0. Kircheimer, supra note 10, at 47.
13. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
14. J. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials 145 (2d ed. 1986). The first edition of
this book appeared in 1964.
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To understand the Sanctuary Trials as political trials requires elucidat-
ing the sources of the Movement's emergence as a political challenge to
the U.S. government. Thus, the following pages will focus on the back-
ground out of which the Movement arose and on the style of interactive
behavior which came to characterize Sanctuary fora and Sanctuary-gov-
ernment relations. Section I will further explore the origins of Sanctuary
with a particular view to its situation within the biblical tradition of sanc-
tuary and to the inherent politicization of its various activities. It is impor-
tant to realize that this politicization existed from the beginning, alongside
and regardless of the religious motivations claimed for or attributed to
these activities. It originated in the Movement's disagreement with various
procedural and substantive aspects of United States policy regarding refu-
gees and Central America, and in previous internal disputes over other
foreign policies such as those leading to the Vietnam War. Section II will
discuss the development of the U.S. government's response to the Sanctu-
ary Movement and the construction of the Sanctuary Trials as political
trials. In turn, this discussion will serve as background for my concluding
argument that the socio-political significance of the Sanctuary Movement
resides in the empowerment which its participatory activities provided its
members and which existing legal and political regimes and procedures
could not accommodate.
As a form of legal sociology, the following pages offer one of the chap-
ters that a book aiming to provide an understanding of the Sanctuary
Movement might include. As the chapter seeking to understand the Move-
ment as the socio-political context for a political trial, it inevitably over-
emphasizes the political and legal nature of the Movement's actors, activi-
ties, experiences, and theoretical underpinnings, just as the chapter on the
Sanctuary Movement as religious challenge and praxis would overempha-
size its religiously portentous aspects. Such overemphasis does not intend
that this analytical perspective is somehow the best for grasping the rich
social text and significance of the Sanctuary Movement. Rather, by pro-
viding one of many overlapping explanations of the Movement, it seeks to
balance some of the impressions created by the strong emphasis on the
faith-based and apolitical origins of the Movement in many of the more
widely available accounts of Sanctuary.15 And it seeks to provide a frame-
work for a broader and much needed discussion of appropriate responses
to the government's extraordinary legal practices in prosecuting Sanctuary
workers and of the challenges posed by Sanctuary as a new participation-
intensive socio-political movement in the United States.
15. See, e.g., I. Bau, This Ground is Holy: Church Sanctuary and Central American Refugees
(1985); R. Golden & M. McConnell, Sanctuary: The New Underground Railroad (1986).
[Vol. 2: 381
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I. BIRTH OF THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
The account of the origins of the Sanctuary Movement which in-
troduces this article provides the basic "facts" or contours but little sense
of an ab initio and inherently political dynamic. It leaves open whether
Sanctuary did or had to constitute a new movement of socio-political im-
portance rather than remaining "just" another punctuation in the history
of church-state relations.'" The account invokes admiration for the sponta-
neous and pious charity of those involved and appreciation for the Tucson
and Chicago church groups in an almost guilt-relieving fashion: Thank
goodness someone did something for those "poor" people fleeing torture
and threats of being "disappeared."
Political confrontation, awareness, and motivation seem to have been
both afterthoughts and products of happenstance, rather than inherent,
inevitable, or sought-after dimensions. If these refugees had been the dis-
traught and displaced, fleeing flood or famine rather than political vio-
lence, churches in the welcoming communities would undoubtedly have
reacted similarly in providing sustenance, shelter, and safety. And they
would have provided this succor regardless of whether the needing people
were American citizens, properly documented foreigners, or "illegal
aliens." That the INS had border patrol powers and personal jurisdiction
over the Central American refugees was irrelevant to the inclination of the
local church groups to offer charity. That church aid conflicted with the
"illegal" status of the refugees was not the determining source of Sanctu-
ary's politicization or political significance, at least not in the perspective
of many of the Movement's early workers.
Neither was this conflict between charity and "law" fully determinative
of the Movement's significance in the eyes of government authorities such
as the INS. Throughout history, churches and the concept of sanctuary
have filled important gaps in individuals' lives, which their relationships
with the state-whether lordly, liberal, or bureaucratically welfaris-
tic-have not or could not fill. Such gap-filling has been variously a wel-
come supplement to state welfar.e activities, a source of conflict with state
policies allocating resources and ordering social relations, and an escape
valve for domestic conflicts concerning political, social, and legal issues.
The technical legality of providing such aid or sanctuary has rarely deter-
mined when it would constitute a political challenge to the state, its proce-
dures, or its policies.
16. See Nichols, Favour in the Wilderness: Sanctuary Politics and the Shaping of American
Refugee Policy, 2 Refugee Issues 1 (Aug. 1985); Brief for Respondents, United States v. Aguilar, 871
F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-1208).
Pirie
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A. The Biblical Tradition of Sanctuary
In ancient times in the Levitical lands, for example, sanctuary provided
a means to avoid the interminable violence of blood-for-blood feuding and
modify the harsh punishments characteristic of local law or custom.
Criminals fearing execution or amputation could seek sanctuary at the
altar of local deities or in the tents of desert Arabs, at least on a
temporary basis.1" Having had to flee their kin or clan into conditions of
insecurity and dependence, they did not escape all the pain of punishment.
But having fled, they no longer forced their prior "government" to either
execute the traditional sentence or risk the undermining of its authority
and social structures.
Sanctuary became less dependent upon personalized appeals to specific
civic or religious personalities when Moses built whole cities of refuge in
the biblical lands. These cities provided refugees, particularly those fleeing
the vengeance of their victims' kin, access to a regularized form of asylum:
If, for example, they had killed a person or committed some other grave
offense, local custom would have tolerated or expected retributory killing
by injured family members. The system of sanctuary cities, however,
made it possible for transgressors to secure the de facto commutation of
their death sentences into a relatively comfortable life imprisonment
within the boundaries of a sanctuary city. 8
At one level, such sanctuary certainly conflicted with the notion of retri-
bution and the power structures it supported. But sanctuary also helped to
minimize the violence characteristic of quid pro quo vengeance, which
rarely stops after a first round of transgression and retribution. Because
retributory justice could lead to feuding, pitting clan against clan over
long periods of time, it threatened the tenuous bonds of social cooperation
uniting peoples in geographical areas like the Levant, as much as it also
resolved disputes expeditiously and reinforced those communal bonds by
imparting a sense of the high costs attending the transgression of their
supporting norms.
Sanctuary thus provided a safety valve to accommodate the inevitable
and self-destructive pressures of a flawed system of justice in the ancient
biblical land. It has done likewise in many other parts of the world at
various times throughout history, including pre-seventeenth century Eng-
land,'9 ancient Greece and Rome, the islands of Polynesia prior to Euro-
pean colonization, and in the Hanseatic cities of pre-modern Germania.2"
17. 1. Bau, supra note 15, at 127-28.
18. See Ryan, supra note 5, at 211-12 (1987).
19. See Harding, Social History of England 120 (1966); Note, The Underground Railroad and
the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History, Litigation and Values, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1429,
1432-33 (1987).
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But the Judaeo-Christian tradition is the most important for present pur-
poses, since Sanctuary leaders often referred to it explicitly as they en-
gaged in the dialogues and justificatory practices and constructed the
Movement's social meaning for participants, observers, and opponents.
In view of this tradition, it is possible to interpret the government's
initial downplaying of the Sanctuary Movement as an implicit, subcon-
scious, convenient, or perhaps merely coincidental recognition that church
sanctuary had the potential to actually reinforce wider community poli-
cies. In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration was escalating its ac-
tivity in Central America. Past experience seemed to show that framing
Central American events and politics as a hemispheric battle against com-
munist encroachment provided the best chances for a quiet and plentiful
flow of needed funds from Capitol Hill. The mass media's ability to bring
a war home to the United States was well documented. Archbishop Ro-
mero's assassination, for example, could have been made into a communi-
cative event or symbol as powerful and unequivocal as the self-immolation
of a Buddhist monk in downtown Saigon years before. The media had
only to present the testimonials of fleeing Salvadorans to popularize these
refugees as overland "boat people" and evoke protests at their deportation
not unlike the outcry over Malaysia's refusal to allow the Indochinese
onto their shores in 1975.
But in fact, the media's early focus on the Christian and charity aspects
of Sanctuary activities and on the U.S. government's denials of asylum to
the Central American refugees diverted attention from the role of the U.S.
government in perpetuating the human rights abuses and instability which
caused the refugees's northward flight. That early Sanctuary was tied to
community church groups meant that its sources of information and inter-
pretation could, accurately enough, be described as religious relative to
purportedly more accurate and "balanced" political sources, and so Sanc-
tuary was portrayed as within the escape valve tradition of biblical
sanctuary.
The sanctuary tradition, however, represents far more than a mere po-
litical escape valve through which a government resorts to alternative pro-
cedures for destructive conflicts. It also includes the notion of tolerating
appeals to alternative concepts or codes of substantive justice. Biblical
sanctuaries offered respite, not merely from the procedures of local custom
or law, but also from its norms.
For example, biblical rather than customary laws governing the egre-
giousness of particular actions would determine the eligibility of asylum
applicants for sustenance, shelter, and safety. In determining guilt and
exculpability, biblical justice often emphasized individual motive and fault
rather than status relations, inter-clan or inter-tribe boundaries, and the
needs of social harmony, as was typical of customary law. Perpetrators of
negligent or accidental homicides could receive sanctuary once a refuge
9
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city had judged them both eligible and in need." Once within the sanctu-
ary walls, refugees apparently became community members, largely un-
differentiated by origin or entry.22 They had entered the realm of an al-
ternative code of justice as asylees, rather than pardonees or skulking
fugitives.2"
Similarly, the Sanctuary Movement invokes biblical law as an alterna-
tive to INS rules for determining asylum eligibility. Whereas the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act focuses on whether refugees will likely
face persecution if they return to their homelands,24 the Bible commands
care and respect for the "ger" or refugee,25 and emphasizes the innocence
of those who shun violence or use it only for biblically cognizable ends. It
welcomes Central American refugees not only to a safe haven but also as
members of a shared faith community.
As a movement avowedly based on the biblical tradition, then, Sanctu-
ary need not be viewed as committing civil disobedience by adhering to
some higher law without the interpretive mediation of a temporal govern-
ment. Rather, offering sanctuary, as a religious proposition, involves
presenting an alternative26 to United States immigration law not inconsis-
tent with the fullest sense of separation of church and state. The substan-
tive norms and procedures of that secular law of biblical sanctuary aim as
much to harmonize intra- and inter-community relations as did righteous
vengeance for the tribes in the Levant. And, as in biblical times, compet-
ing conceptions of justice need not be duelling visions, even when they
operate within a given territory without the hierarchy of federalism to
express the terms of their coexistence. Just as Sanctuary's alternative pro-
cedures for realizing justice could provide a safety valve to protect the
government's ability to realize various macro and micro political aims, so
the substance of biblical justice could provide a safety valve to help the
United States better accommodate the inconsistencies and rigidities within
its own substantive law and flickering world view.
Even when the Sanctuary Movement later supplemented its biblical vi-
sion with a secular vision of justice drawn from international humanita-
rian and refugee law, it still did not inevitably politicize its activities in a
manner or to a degree that would cause a breakdown in Kircheimian po-
litical justice. That alternative secular vision could coexist with domestic
21. See I. Bau, supra note 15, at 125-26 (1985). See also Ryan, supra note 5, at 211-12.
22. See, e.g., Leiticus 19:33-34 ("The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the
native among you, and you shall love him as yourself .... ).
23. One sees this transmutation of status in other sanctuary traditions as well. Serfs who reached
one of the German Hansa or cities and resided there for twenty four hours would acquire status as a
free person linked to the network of these free trade cities.
24. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
25. See Leviticus 19:33-34.
26. Of course, Sanctuary workers say and always have said that the alternative law is a higher
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political law as international law has always done-in tension, perhaps,
but not threatening to existing configurations of political power.
The political problem posed by Sanctuary was not its relation to state
policy per se. If one views modern sanctuary as a movement of faith and
charity based on biblical tradition and offering an alternative jus-
tice-even a critique of United States legal and substantive justice-one
cannot explain why, from its very inception, it was a political movement
destined to cause or explode a crisis in American political justice. Alterna-
tive explanations of the politicization of Sanctuary-government rela-
tions-whether a chosen tactic, the result of Sanctuary bursting the limits
of coexistence, fallout from its appropriating secular laws to supplement
biblical teaching, the result of INS overreaction, the ripple effect of evehts
in Managua, San Salvador and Washington, D.C., or the result of the
emergence of secular sanctuaries-seem forced or incomplete. Each of
these factors certainly added to the political force of the Movement, but
none were necessary or sufficient to foist Sanctuary into the political trial
annals. Rather, as a result of the "quality of the politics being pursued"
by both Sanctuary and the government-as a result of the broader legal
and political background of United States refugee policy to which the
Sanctuary Movement was responding, if at first somewhat unwit-
tingly-the Movement could not benefit from the notion of peaceful
coexistence.
B. United States Refugee Policy and Law
Between United States withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the onset
of North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge oppression, "boat people" flooded
the Indochinese sea, Malaysian beaches, Hong Kong harbor, and the
Thai border. Sympathy-arousing stories swamped the media. American
aid money flowed to the non-governmental organizations aiding refugees
and many communities and local church groups geared up to assist and
resettle the refugees. And, with little dispute, Congress passed the 1980
Refugee Act 7 to regularize and apoliticize United States refugee policy in
accordance with the dictates of international law2" and liberal legalism.
The Refugee Act provided for the supposedly apolitical adjudication of
individual asylum cases under a neutral and humanitarian legal standard,
namely the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard used in interna-
tional law to determine who is a refugee. 9 But the structure and adminis-
27. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.A.).
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (reaffirming Congress' intent to
"conform the language of 243 [the deportation withholding section of the INA] to the Convention [on
the Status of Refugees, supra note 2], . so that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obliga-
tions under international agreements").
29. See supra note 2.
Pirie
11
Pirie: The Origins of a Political Trial
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1990
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
tration of the Refugee Act soon reflected important ambivalences in Amer-
ican politics about using legalism to create and protect rights for
vulnerable people, particularly where those rights impinge national
macroeconomic or geopolitical concerns.
One problem with the Act has been the vagueness of the definition
which refugees must satisfy. What is a "well-founded fear of persecution"
after all? And, more specifically, what exactly is encompassed by the term
"persecution"? This vagueness has allowed the refugee determination pro-
cess and its outcomes to be manipulated by Cold War thinking and prac-
tices: Victims of relatively trivial and barely founded economic depriva-
tions, like Martina Navratilova, receive asylum, so long as they "flee"
communist regimes, while victims with written death threats and the
physical scars of previous torture are unlikely to receive asylum, especially
if fleeing a United States ally.30 Lawyers representing refugees have been
co-opted into spending vast amounts of effort debating technicalities rather
than fighting for an expanded definition of political refugee or for a deter-
mination process that would give the promise of political asylum more
substantive reality.
It is significant that the United States, a country largely constituted of
refugees, the indentured, the enslaved, and their descendants, a country
that has preached far and wide the evils of "persecution," and a country
preoccupied with legalistic standards, has contented itself with such a ma-
nipulable notion of who is a refugee, of who has been or fears being "per-
secuted." Persecution is most definitely not the only term in American
political and legal culture which is vague, manipulable, and manipulated,
yet crucial to the realization of someone's rights: "Cruel and unusual pun-
ishment," "clear and present danger," "discrimination on the basis of race
or gender," and "equal opportunity" are others. As the litigation history
of these other terms shows, it is precisely when the political "understand-
ings" and compromises wrapped up in these words are laid bare as illegit-
imate, non-existent, or obsolete that legalism is unmasked and political
trials may occur. 1
That the Sanctuary Movement concerns such an unravelling of under-
standings and unmasking of compromises becomes evident if we examine
the implications of the U.S. government trying to administer the Refugee
Act to Latin Americans. Vague as the United States' definition of persecu-
tion may be, lawmakers, the INS, and judges early developed a consensus
that persecution, at least for asylum purposes, does not include genera-
lized poverty-even when the poverty is so severe as to deprive its victims
30. See Note, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecution" in United States Refugee
Law, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 187 (1986).
31. With regard to "clear and present danger," for example, one thinks of the "Red Scare Trials"
of the 19 50s, and with regard to "cruel and unusual punishment," the trials involving corporal pun-
ishment and other degradations of slaves and then later blacks in the South come to mind.
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of basic needs or is attributable to government malfeasance or neglect.
This consensus, however, assumes that the economic and political causes
of human misery and flight are distinct, or at least distinguishable with
the aid of some reasonably coherent legal fiction.
INS and judicial interpretations have also taken advantage of the
vagueness of the refugee definition to deny asylum to Central Americans
in a manner strikingly similar to how judicial interpretations of such
terms as "equal opportunity" and "racial discrimination" have largely
eviscerated the promises of the Civil Rights era for minorities and women.
Particularly harmful has been the interpretation requiring asylum appli-
cants to prove that they have been personally targeted for persecution, that
their danger is different and greater than that which people in their re-
gion experience. On its face, distinguishing between "persecution" and the
more generalized ravages of a guerrilla-fought civil war may seem tena-
ble. In practice, though, people fleeing war zones have to demonstrate
harsher circumstances to warrant protection than did people fleeing non-
war zones like Cuba and the U.S.S.R.
The bureaucratic nature of the asylum process further exacerbates the
problem of (flawed) legalism in the human rights context: Many Latin
American individuals could convince the average American and even the
average INS official in the comfort of his home or place of worship of the
severity of the ill treatment that they faced in their homelands and that
this treatment was because of reasons that American political theory and
popular myth view as prototypically political-reasons like membership
in a certain political party. Yet, if they are fleeing regimes friendly to the
United States, they will not likely convince most judges or INS officials in
their official capacity that they are refugees. Judges and INS officials, like
other bureaucrats, tend to view members of groups whom they must "pro-
cess," but about whom they know very little, as similarly situated. They
recast individual applicant's stories to fit the patterns set by others in the
same nationality group. This, of course, hinders asylum seekers in show-
ing that they face individualized persecution.
In addition to their own previous decisions concerning other members
of a given group, bureaucrats also rely on official sources of information,
which usually claim that Central Americans are economic migrants facing
merely the "normal" dangers of civil war. The main source of information
relied on by INS judges is the State Department, which issues advisory
opinions in every asylum case. Throughout the 1980s, both these opinions
and the Department's annual country reports denied that widespread and
politically motivated human rights violations-that is, persecu-
tion-existed in countries like El Salvador. Such denials, however, ignored
extensive evidence to the contrary reported by organizations with strong
reputations for objectivity and political neutrality such as Amnesty Inter-
national. Yet such denials, by their very authoritativeness as State Depart-
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ment emanations, carried considerable persuasive power not only in INS
and judicial refugee determinations. They also often persuaded the press
and public opinion which for so long resisted the testimonial truth which
Central American victims were trying to promulgate.
That politicized "facts" should be allowed or encouraged to affect the
refugee determination process is not accidental. Many immigration and
foreign policy makers believe that acknowledging someone as a refugee
casts aspersions on the political capacity or moral worth of her home gov-
ernment,32 implying-quite rightly-that that government either perse-
cutes or cannot prevent the persecution of its nationals. Governments sup-
posedly resent such aspersions as meddlesome or insensitive to the political
realities they face, and this resentment supposedly poisons amity to the
detriment of both accused and accusing nations. This is of particular con-
cern for United States-Latin American relations. Sacrificing a "few" Cen-
tral Americans to whatever dangers they face upon deportation is sup-
posed to be worth the cost of keeping hemispheric allies investment-
friendly and politically pliant. But this strategy sacrificed both the liber-
alism-the refugees' right to not be deported when truly threatened-and
the legalism-the refugees' right to fair procedures when determining asy-
lum eligibility-which supposedly govern our self-imposed humanitarian
duties toward persecuted people.
But while the legal fictions about economic migrants and the ever more
expeditious deportations had increased popular unease regarding United
States refugee policy and practices, they had done so indirectly. The reali-
ties of Salvadoran death squads and the Central American wars had to be
"brought home" in order to arouse Americans' suspicion about govern-
ment honesty and provide them with the information-the power-to
question and rebut government accounts. While the mass media provided
the most provocative counter-information in the Vietnam era, the congre-
gation-to-congregation dissemination of information by Sanctuary workers
and refugee testimonials played a key role in causing Americans to analo-
gize this country's involvement in Central America to its involvement in
Vietnam. This analogizing connected to memories of the enormous refu-
gee flows produced by destabilization in Southeast Asia and the perceived
moral callousness of countries like Malaysia when they refused to offer
even temporary asylum. It was a short step in the political intellect of
some Americans from the unpopularity of United States involvement in
Central America to the conviction that, despite government contentions to
the contrary, fleeing Salvadorans were refugees, not economic migrants,
and that providing them sanctuary was a just and a humanitarian duty.
Ironically, this was precisely the assessment which the government's ef-
32. See Note, supra note 30.
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forts to ignore, trivialize, and later threaten the Sanctuary Movement
sought to preempt.
To a large extent the public's analysis never penetrated to the political
and legal contradictions outlined above and inherent in United States ref-
ugee law. Rather, it tended toward a generalized distress about the inhu-
mane effects of a supposedly humanitarian refugee law, while perhaps
linking the increasing salience of refugee and Sanctuary news to the in-
creasing American involvement in Central America. But even this limited
analysis was sufficient to cause many Americans to question their political
elites, and the underlying political and legal contradictions prevented those
elites from providing satisfyingly coherent rebuttals.
It does not take much questioning, particularly questioning frustrated
by unsatisfactory answers, to activate political consciousness. And it does
not take much activation to provoke a crisis in political justice. Noam
Chomsky, Michael Parenti, and others have argued that in the United
States political justice (writ small) depends significantly on mystification
and keeping the citizenry factually ignorant and analytically unconfident,
a phenomenon in which the media plays no small role." Thus, when the
public asked about the relationship between United States involvement in
Central America, the refugees' stories, and the need for sanctuaries, this
created a dilemma for those who must act or answer in some manner to
nip questioning in its delicate bud. Existing practices of political discourse
and compromise just could not accommodate, let alone resolve, the threats
to existing political justice that were implicit in the juxtaposition of the
questions being asked and any relatively candid answers. That the govern-
ment sought to gag the active and quash the curious in prosecuting the
Sanctuary Movement is remarkably unsurprising. 4
C. Birth of the Political Sanctuary Movement
In contrast to the charity and faith aspects of Sanctuary which standard
accounts of the origins of the Sanctuary Movement emphasize, the politi-
cal aspects of traditional Sanctuary and the conflicted status of United
States refugee policy demand inquiry into the extent which political
awareness, perhaps only latently political, can be said to have given birth
to the Sanctuary Movement. In explaining how refugee testimonials and
INS treatment of Central Americans and their American sympathizers
struck a political chord rather than, or at least in addition to, a religious
chord, this inquiry does not seek to deny the sincerity of many Sanctuary
workers' religious beliefs or deny that religious discourse, by making the
33. See Chomsky, Manufactured Consent (1986) (Silha Center for the Study of Media, Ethics,
and Law, Working Paper No. 86114); M. Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Me-
dia (1986).
34. Sanctuary defendants Jack Elder and Stacey Merkt, for example, were prohibited by court
order from discussing their trials or Sanctuary activities with anyone but their lawyers.
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political issues so ascertainable and transmissible, was crucial in motivat-
ing Sanctuary workers and to the Movement's threat to political justice.
But we should be open to the possibility that threat grew out of Sanctuary
churches refusing to seek coexistence with local and national secular re-
gimes (as had their biblical models), if coexistence would endanger either
the refugees or their own moral integrity-as had happened when many
of them had failed to actively help refugees fleeing Naziism.
It seems undeniable that, from early on, the Movement's agenda was
broader and more challenging than that of the biblical sanctuaries that
provided alternative procedures and norms of justice, even though many
Sanctuary workers saw their main task as providing relief rather than
challenging policy or policy making. Firmly held religious beliefs may
have dictated the need for Sanctuary action, but the Movement sought to
challenge substantive policy and policymaking procedures, including, in
particular, the participatory role of affected groups and individuals. It also
sought to educate people in political affairs-in Central American reali-
ties and the role of the U.S. government in that region. And, most impor-
tantly, it sought to empower people as critics and actors in their environ-
ments and vis-a-vis their government. These goals seem much broader
than what a faith-based response to the refugees' needs would evoke.
The initial church responses to the increased refugee flows were argua-
bly apolitical and did not seek to challenge any secular status quo, includ-
ing, the status quo of local church-state relations. Standard versions of the
Sanctuary story are correct in implying that Rev. John Fife's Southside
United Presbyterian Church in Tucson would have given hospice to the
now well-known group of refugees who were found, almost dead from
dehydration, after having been abandoned in the desert by their coyote 5
in late 1980 just as surely if they had been Mexican economic migrants in
search of better paying jobs or local Hispanic Americans roughed up by
the police for some reason. The border churches, after all, worked in com-
munities where INS apprehension, detention, and deportation of Mexi-
cans and other Central Americans was routine. Apprehension was invari-
ably abusive, regardless of whether a particular Latino was a United
States citizen or a foreigner. Many of the early Sanctuary workers had
long provided church-based charity visits to the INS detention centers,
bringing food and the like to the detainees.36 But deportation, at least
according to the myths supporting the local practice of "acquiescence" to
INS rule, had a loophole for those facing persecution: according to the
35. "Coyote" is the modern, originally slang, term to denote those people paid to escort aliens into
the United States without formal INS inspection. Coyotes have a reputation of charging exorbitant
prices for their services and often subjecting their clients to horrendous transport and shelter
conditions.
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myth, INS procedures would filter out most Mexicans as economic mi-
grants and deport them, but would protect the truly persecuted and offer
them a haven.
This church "acquiescence" to INS rule was not necessarily the result
of inflexibility or insensitivity to the political and economic realities which
Central American migrants and early refugees faced. Rather, it reflected,
like the many other routines or response patterns which constitute daily
practices everywhere, a somewhat happenstance complex of adaptive com-
promises struck by the necessity for at least a minimal regularity and sta-
bility in communal procedures and boundaries. In the American tradition
of fairly conservative Christian churches, local churches (including those
who were anything but "conservative" in their general outlook on social
issues) had usually policed a strict church-state boundary themselves. This
tradition was what the Sanctuary Movement both denied and had to
overcome.
On one level, the churches' role in the regime of legalism prior to the
emergence of the Sanctuary Movement was similar to that of the biblical
sanctuaries: They provided an alternative, but coexisting, source of charity
to that which the secular community could provide or would approve. But
the strength of the myth of legalism in the modern era, in contrast to its
near non-existence under the regimes of the Levitical era, obviated the
need for the border churches to provide alternative procedures and norms
of justice to those offered by an external but flawed system of justice as
existed under customary, clan-oriented law. Legalism, in other words, had
obviated the need and the room for the church to play an insistent and
daily political role.
This accepted or (depending on one's perspective) imposed apoliticism
of the church does not mean that church members were not political be-
ings-and active ones at that. It is rather that many Christian and Jewish
Americans either treat political beliefs and religious commitments as au-
tonomous of each other or constantly reinterpret the religious to accommo-
date rather than question political conceptions and interpretations of con-
crete reality. Thus, while the refugee testimonials caused the charity
donors, as people of Christian faith, to increase their support and "emo-
tional aid" to those claiming refuge .beyond what they routinely accorded,
for example, Mexican migrant labor, their most significant role was in
awakening the political selves of various people both in and outside of the
church relief effort. This awakening-or "conscientization"-was crucial
in enabling Sanctuary workers to understand and act upon the refugees'
fundamental message that Christianity is very, very political. This awak-
ening of their political selves was a prerequisite to the politicization of
their religious selves that became most visible in the conversion of reli-
gious shelter and doctrine to serve political ends in the legitimation, and
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often the endorsement of the doctrines and practices of Liberation
Theology.
That political conscientization was born out of the interaction between
awakened political concern about refugees and United States involvement
in Central America and the political backdrop and legal structure of
United States refugee law and foreign policymaking is evident if one looks
at the experiences and claims of Jim Corbett, the Harvard Quaker and
self-professed "unbeliever" who was among the first to convert his own
buildings into sanctuaries, help refugees cross the Rio Grande undetected
by the INS, and provide the nascent Sanctuary Movement with a vision
and a voice. He was a man deeply involved with cultural and political
phenomena of the border region and certainly aware of the reality of INS
detention and deportation practices. Some chroniclers of the Sanctuary
Movement claim that "Corbett was understandably shocked at the discov-
ery that the INS was ready to stoop to such trickery to avoid fulfilling its
obligations toward refugees" ' by denying him access to detained
Salvadorans to help them secure legal representation. But even these
chroniclers will admit that Corbett at an earlier visit to the Nogales jail in
Arizona had used the subterfuge of passing as his namesake, a former
Mayor of Tucson, to gain access to refugees detained there. Corbett was
skilled at using legalism to fight INS practices that hindered refugees'
access to legal aid. He had, for example, secured court injunctions improv-
ing lawyers' access to detention centers to help refugees file asylum
petitions.
But from the very beginning, Corbet was not willing to settle for just
keeping the INS within the rule of law when that rule of law was actively
being used to subvert substantive humanitarian law. He realized that the
only hope for protecting refugees was to help them cross the border and
remain undetected by the INS. To help him and the refugees, Corbett
called on Fife, and then an ever increasing circle of politically sympathetic
churches and communities, rather than on the closest, most charity-ori-
ented or resource-endowed churches and communities. Too many of them
might have turned the cause down as precisely that, a cause, rather than a
call for charity.
It is also significant that Corbett and with him Fife and others relied on
churches and towns to provide sanctuary. They "went public" with their
activities. The underground of illegal alien existence, an underground
with substantial connections throughout the Southwest, would probably
have provided more security from INS detection and apprehension than
did the self-publicized sanctuaries. But Corbett and others involved in
Sanctuary as a political activity had other purposes in mind than mere
protective refuge. They wanted sanctuaries that were impregnable but
37. See MacEoin, supra note 1, at 18.
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highly visible as political platforms from which to lay bare the hypocrisies
and lies they saw in United States foreign policy and domestic liberalism.
It was in this spirit that, on March 24, 1982, on the second anniversary of
Archbishop Romero's death, Fife draped his church with banners reading,
"This is a Sanctuary for the oppressed of Central America" and "Immi-
gration: Do not profane the sanctuary of God." Fife also wrote to Attor-
ney General William French Smith to inform him that Southside Church
would violate the harboring aliens law to counter the "immoral, as well as
illegal" administration of United States refugee law. 8 And Sanctuary's
famous "underground railroad" for transporting refugees from the South-
west to northern states or to Canada was anything but underground. The
tenor and style of the railroad resembled more the Civil Rights Movement
in the South in the 1960s than the anti-slave underground railroad of the
previous century: As they travelled into the Northeast, many of the refu-
gee transporters draped their cars with signs proclaiming their activity
and mission. In addition, Sanctuary refugees often presented their testi-
mony publicly-albeit with bandannas tied over their faces-not only to
church congregations considering Sanctuary, but also to broader audiences
interested in a less filtered and alternative version of Central American
reality to that promulgated by the State Department and popularized by
the press. As Corbett explained:
We decided to go public because we had all become aware that a
full-scale holocaust was going on in Central America, and by keep-
ing the operation clandestine we were doing exactly what the gov-
ernment wanted us to do-keeping it hidden, keeping the issue out
of the public view. 9
The birth of the Sanctuary Movement, then, did consist of both reli-
gious and political elements with respect to both its concrete activity and
its motivating forces. But from the perspective of an agenda focusing on
Sanctuary's implications for political justice, the religious charity involved
was, at least at the birth of Sanctuary, only a complementary element and
unlikely to have spawned the Movement. Local regimes of church-state
coexistence were based on a legalism that, at least in appearance, obviated
the need for such alternative procedures and norms of justice as the Levit-
ical sanctuaries had provided.
The problem for the initiation of a faith-based response was that, under
the tranquilizer of legalism, many Christians had stopped reading the Bi-
ble with their eyes open, so that now their perception was blurred and
38. R. Golden & M. McConnell, supra note 15, at 47-48. See also P. Lernoux, Cry of the
People: The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America-The Catholic Church in Conflict with
U.S. Policy (1982).
39. R. Golden & M. McConnell, supra note 15, at 47.
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their reactions dulled."' Shaking off the deep-rooted narcosis of interpreta-
tions of the Bible calling for meekness, patience, passivity, and obedience
to secular authority in secular affairs required a challenge from outside of
the prevailing church doctrine and practice.
The challenge to political justice could not come from the lawyers qua
lawyers who were involved in trying to secure asylum for Central Ameri-
cans. In fact, their response was even more persistently legalistic than that
of the church communities. For the most part, they were just as bound
within the confines of a system of thought and practice sufficiently coher-
ent, complete, and time consuming to obviate perceiving the need for or
allowing the undertaking of a thoroughgoing reevaluation of their enter-
prise and their role vis-a-vis policymaking. The lawyers continued to de-
bate the relative and absolute meanings of terms like "well-founded fear"
or "clear probability" of persecution, while the government continued to
deport refugees and escalate its military involvement in Central America.
Rather, it took conscientized political actors like Corbett and Fife to
create an adequate and political response to the plight of the Central
American refugees. It took politicized actors and political arguments to
create the momentum to sweep church groups, cities, and others into a
broadly-focused challenge to the hypocrisies and ambivalences of United
States foreign policy and policymaking that would also challenge the hy-
pocrisies and ambivalences of United States domestic policy and poli-
cymaking in recognition of the fact that "foreign policy to an extraordi-
nary degree reflects a government's attitude toward its own people.""' It
took, in other words, people who perceived their enterprise as inevitably
political and confrontational. As Jack Elder, an early arrestee among the
Sanctuary workers, said about his upcoming trial:
I am looking for a confrontation. Not to be self-righteous about it,
but there's a moral force behind what we're doing [in the Sanctuary
Movement] that has the potential to focus some light on foreign pol-
icy. [The Administration] refuse[s] to look at the deeper issues.
There's a war going on in El Salvador now; there are bombing raids
financed by the U.S. government. This is the issue people are fleeing
from. 42
While the handful of people involved in channelling the churches' faith-
based charity response into a coherent movement seem to have had a dis-
tinctly political agenda, and while the tradition of church-state relations in
the American polity seem to have precluded a (merely) faith-based origin
to the Sanctuary Movement, this, of course, does not mean that those par-
40. See Wallis, Waging Peace, in Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 169.
41. Coffin, The Tasks Ahead, in Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 180.
42. Cited in R. Golden & M. McConnell, supra note 15, at 68-69.
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ticipating in and constituting the spread of Sanctuary would also perceive
of their enterprise in primarily political rather than religious terms. Nor
does it mean that non-participants, and the government in particular,
would necessarily perceive Sanctuary as a political movement. Yet, with-
out these conceptions of the Sanctuary Movement as political, it would
have been difficult for the Sanctuary Movement to have involved a politi-
cal dynamic strong enough to threaten political justice and incur govern-
ment attempts to marginalize and later silence its message.
In most cases, though, Sanctuary participants did perceive themselves to
be politically engaged, even if a large part of their rhetoric was religiously
referential. And at least as a partial result, the U.S. government also came
to perceive of Sanctuary as politically significant, a reaction which only
hardened, rather than diffused, the political convictions and motivations of
those involved. But while these mutually reinforcing patterns of interac-
tion between the government and Sanctuary participants seem to have
provided much of the momentum to the threat to political justice which
Sanctuary came to represent, the Movement and the government response
also each had their own internal dynamics. Ultimately, it was the clash of
these dynamics, rather than the spiralling interaction pattern thereby in-
duced, that defined the need for a political trial.
In large part, the spread of Sanctuary as a political movement was the
result of the awakening of Bible readers to the narcotic affects of legalistic
notions about the separation of church and state. In particular, Bible
readers rejected the idea that the church should have no opinion or re-
sponsibility regarding the United States' role in Central American human
rights abuses. The people thus awakened realized that they had developed
a political voice and had heard a political calling. Those that chose to heed
the call by joining the Sanctuary Movement seemed to fall in two groups:
Those for whom the politicization of their religious activities removed the
barriers to participation in the political process-barriers imposed by their
religion and its acquiescence in the regime of legalism; and, those who had
always been politically awake but were too timid to act in political
fora-Nicodemuses in the Gospel story.4"
As already mentioned, the basic vehicle for the conversion of church
groups to Sanctuary was refugees' testimony about Central American ex-
perience and arguments from Move*ment leaders like Corbett about INS
deportation practices and government policies regarding Central America.
Church groups considering Sanctuary would invite members of other
sanctuaries, refugees, and often INS officials and immigration lawyers to
make presentations about the pros, cons, and legal implications of Sanctu-
ary involvement. The conversional success of these presentations seems to
have rested largely on two factors: (1) The fact that the Sanctuary work-
43. See MacEoin, supra note 1, at 25.
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ers and refugees had access to more convincing information about Central
America than that which the press and INS officials promulgated, and (2)
the immanence of the refugees' testimony when presented in the particular
forum used by the Sanctuary Movement.
To be persuasive, the refugees' testimony had to be perceived as accu-
rate and coherent. The refugees' audience had been hearing the U.S. gov-
ernment describe-and the press largely mimic-how the Central Ameri-
can refugees were really economic migrants coming to "el norte" to steal
jobs from hardworking Americans. According to the official accounts,
United States involvement in the Central American upheaval staved off
Cuban and Soviet influence and helped protect human rights. Government
spokespersons dismissed the endorsement of Sanctuary by the mainline
religious denominations "as the action of misled do-gooders" who lacked
the U.S. government's expert understanding of Latin America."" But the
refugees brought personal knowledge rather than reports, and they
brought it in person to the church congregations without the U.S. govern-
ment, the press, or church pastors as reinterpretive mediators. According
to the Movement's advocates, the stories told by refugees about conditions
in their home countries and en route to the United States, and their oft
repeated desire to return to their farms, their families, and their home-
lands, "cut right through the webs of deception spun by politicians and
cold warriors."
4 5
But how did the (mostly) middle-class Americans who participated in
the Movement come to believe the refugees' message? How did they
achieve a sense of personal responsibility and become aware and active?
This certainly was not a simple process. As Sister Darlene Nicorgski, a
defendant in one of the Sanctuary cases, writes: "The message of the
prophets from the South [was] often hard for us to hear-we who love so
much and live in a sense of righteousness and with the illusion of power
and control."46 From the perspective of people used to a firm separation
of church and state concerns, the refugees' stories must have seemed a
jumble at first: As Nicorgski says, "What appears [in those stories] to be
religious is politics, [and] what appears to be political is faith lived in the
public form."47
The refugees did not overcome this sense of jumble and confusion in
their audiences through rational argument alone. Rather, by shaking the
dominant world views of many in the religious community, the refugees
provoked a widespread and often acute sense of cognitive dissonance
among many considering Sanctuary. There was no choice but to search
44. Corbett, The Covenant as Sanctuary, in Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 193-94.
45. ld. at 194.
46. Sr. D. Nicorgski, quoted in Statement of Faith of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Cen-
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for a new "world view" or "ideology" with which to make sense of the
refugee stories. By taking their audiences through a process of "critically
reflecting at deeper and deeper levels about how human beings live and
die in this world," the refugees "conscientized" through their testimoni-
als.48 Those whom Sanctuary reached became not only conscientious
about truth but confident in their own ability to appreciate alternative
truths.
Much of the conscientization which Sanctuary encouraged came as a
result of two aspects of refugee testimony which enhanced their coherence
and acceptability. First, these testimonials were strongly influenced by
Liberation Theology,49 a new thinking in Latin American churches which
emphasizes active opposition to all forms of oppression. This new, popu-
larly-based thinking is a Christian discourse that is highly political and
quite unlike any other Christian doctrine. When, for example, refugees
said that they along with their audiences "are all in search of peace and
justice," and that they "believe in this as Christians and as people,"50 they
were not trying to invoke a faith response as such from the northern
Christian churches. Rather, they were offering to teach them alternative
ways of actively seeing the world, of better understanding one's own as
well as others' oppression, and of actively resisting rather than patiently
relying on the belief that someday the meek will inherit the earth. Impor-
tantly, these teachings also provided a way to place the disturbing stories
about torture and the U.S. government's role in Central America into
some tolerably coherent world view that could order and interpret such
stories and help to evoke and channel appropriate responses.
The testimonials encouraged conscientization, secondly, through their
systematic analysis of phenomena. The refugees' stories, with their seem-
ing mix of religion and politics and of macro foreign policy and individu-
alized human rights abuses, disrupted many peoples' packages of concepts
and assumptions for digesting world and community news, assessing re-
sponsibility, and determining duty. To be understood at a more than su-
perficial level, these stories demanded that one adopt a new perspective
that saw violence in Central America, not just as an aberration of a few
"sick" torturers or ruthless dictators, but as the affliction of systemic and
systematic violence.51 As Philip Wheaton, an Episcopal priest and director
of the Ecumenical Program for Inter-American Communication and Ac-
tion, asserted at an early national gathering of Sanctuary workers:
48. R. Golden & M. McConnell, supra note 15, at 135. See also supra notes 35-37 and accom-
panying text.
49. See, e.g., P. Berryman, Liberation Theology (1987); P. Berryman, The Religious Roots of
Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions (1984); G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Libera-
tion (1985); P. Lernoux, supra note 38.
50. Berryman, Living with Faith and Hope: Response to All Refugees, in Resource Guide, supra
note 1, at 155.
51. R. Golden & M. McConnell, supra note 15, at 136.
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[W]e are facing a system, not simply an exception to the norm in one
country or another in Central America. . . . The struggle is not
against one man named Ronald Reagan but against an acquisitive
economic system based on the law of gain . . .and the degradation
of human beings. We struggle against a system whose ultimate con-
cern is not refugees and not dictators and not democracies but the
maintenance of an economic order in which we Americans consume
most of the wealth of the resources of this planet.52
The refugee stories, in conjunction with the political analyses of Corbett
and other Sanctuary leaders, imparted a common sense about how the
violence in Central America was caused (at least in part) by the United
States' consistent treatment of its southern neighbors. This violence was
not merely the result of the present escalation of American military in-
volvement in Central America. If so, there would have been room for de-
bate about the political merits of the government's Central American poli-
cies, but no recognition that involvement was symptomatic-in the same
way as the Refugee Act's vagueness about refugees and the church's ac-
quiescence in legalism were symptomatic-of compromises shrouding
sharp divisions of interest, knowledge, and power in American society.
The refugees, as well as the people (like Corbett) who translated their
message, brought to bear their understanding and their common sense to
explain the systemic nature of the United States' Central American asy-
lum policy in terms of domestic political arrangements, in a way that was
both radical and empowering. This was, at the same time, an external
critique of the prevailing notion in the Christian churches that faith
should not directly inform political democratic action by ordinary persons.
In comparison to the usual, highly mediated paths of transmission via
which information flows and decisions are made in American society, the
direct encounter with refugees in small intimate gatherings to consider
Sanctuary was another and crucial source of the Movement's ability to
convince ever more fora to participate. When refugees spoke directly
about their own personal experiences while seated among their audiences,
rather than relying on written reports or broadcast media to convey their
words, they were reaching out to their listeners as individual fellow
human beings, sharing and commonly ensnared in various systemic phe-
nomena. Their presentation bridged that "great distance between those
who make decisions and those who are affected by them, [which] tends to
52. Wheaton, Response to Tanez: The Refugee Crisis, Sanctuary and the Bible, in Resource
Guide, supra note 1, at 46-47.
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turn people into objects and to allow them to be treated as cases.""3 It was
hard to disbelieve or discount testimony received under such conditions. 54
But once within the directly confrontational fora in which Sanctuary
issues were usually presented and debated, refugees and the Movement's
leaders like Corbett did not blame their audiences for complicity or even
passivity. By making people see that "foreign policy to an extraordinary
degree reflects a government's attitude toward its own people," the refu-
gees' testimony also suggested that the audience's situation was not, at a
structural level, so different from that of Central Americans, despite the
appearances created by the vast differences in material affluence. "And
that," William Sloane Coffin suggested, "is what our government, con-
sciously or unconsciously, fears the most. . . ."" The cognitive disso-
nance involved in holding both world views simultaneously made a choice
necessary. But the outcome of the choice was not fully dictated: Many of
the congregations did not choose to endorse Liberation Theology and
reconceptualize their relationship to the refugees from one of charity to
one of conscientized atonement and shared activism. Among those who did
choose Sanctuary, some seem to have done so on such grounds as the rela-
tive palatability, coherence, or moral force of the new competing world
view. But it seems that a fair number of people chose Sanctuary and its
implications as members of a choosing group. And here, the fact that
Sanctuary workers targeted churches may have been important: Churches,
in contrast to town council meetings, are both intimate and solacing. Peo-
ple let down their guards more when in their chosen congregation than
when among members of the community at large. Churches also offer
greater psychological space for receiving difficult lessons, at least in part
because there is a psychological comfort to be had in church that is rarely
available in civic fora, at least for those who do not dominate such fora.56
In civic fora, people are individuals, and expected behavior is atomistici in
church, people are brothers and sisters under God, and expected behavior
53. Shaull, A Theology of Sanctuaryfrom a Calvinist Perspective, in Resource Guide, supra note
1, at 65. See also J.T. Noonan, Persons and Masks of the Law: Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson, and
Wythe as Makers of Masks (1976).
54. See also McGrath et al., Bringing Sanctuary to Trial, Time, Oct. 25, 1985 (quoting Gary
Cook, associate pastor of the Central Presbyterian Church in Massillon, Ohio, saying that "We're a
very conservative group of folks politically. But once we encountered the refugees face to face, we
couldn't justify not taking them in.").
55. Coffin, famous for his anti-Vietnam War work while chaplain of Yale University, argued:
"Our foreign aid today to Central America is making the rich richer, the poor poorer, and the mili-
tary more powerful. Isn't that exactly what is happening in our own country? Are not the farmers
who have been protesting ...in Minnesota demonstrating that the need for land redistribution in
this country is fast becoming as urgent as it is in El Salvador ... ?" Coffin, supra note 41, at 180-
81.
56. See, e.g., Brest & Vandenburg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornogra-
phy Movement in Minneapolis, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1987).
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is communal: "In an unredeemed world, we are all refugees in need of
congregational sanctuary....
Sanctuary, whose bottom line message was similar to that implicit in
the Vietnam War resistance, seems also to have depended on the corporate
nature of church congregations for its arguably greater success in mobiliz-
ing a voice of challenge from among traditionally "patriotic"-that is po-
litically complacent-groups than characterized the anti-Vietnam War
movement. Deciding for or against Sanctuary required people to vote for
or against their church or their group becoming a Sanctuary. This in-
volved active, democratic political participation and confronting stark, core
issues, in contrast to the more circumscribed participation characterizing
American politics in civic, especially national fora, where there is little
moral censure for non-participation, where the "issues" are either highly
abstract proxies for underlying conflicts or not issues at all, where individ-
ual votes are perceived to make so little difference. and where, as a result,
people do not vote, speak, or act. Just deciding whether to vote pro or con
about whether one's church becomes a Sanctuary includes more political
thought and activism about an issue than many people had previously
experienced.
II. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
When tackling difficult issues over which people really do disagree,
American politics-with their strong emphasis on process and compro-
mise, instead of substance and conflict-usually brand small, criticism-
oriented groups, particularly ones whose agenda is as broadly focused as
was that of the early Sanctuary workers, as radical and therefore illegiti-
mate. But such groups or mini-movements have rarely experienced the
wrath of court-based political trials. Of course, some small groups-the
Communist Party, for example-have been subject to political trials, but
the threat to political justice that they posed was not their message per se:
The United States is fairly tolerant of radical views as long as their ex-
pres sion does not threaten the structure of existing power relationships.
Particularly in the early years of the Movement, many official, media,
and other observers thought that Sanctuary was basically the extension of
an initial charity response that was using a somewhat political rhetoric to
express an essentially humanitarian distress about deportations to El Sal-
vador and Guatemala. At one dispassionate level, Sanctuary did look a bit
ridiculous: There was Southside Church, all 130 by 75 feet of adobe en-
closed pews, draped with banners daring the U.S. government to take no-
tice of the harboring activities going on inside. Furthermore, the letter to
the government from the Southside congregation accompanying the initial
57. Corbett, supra note 44, at 196.
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public declaration of Sanctuary merely asked that the government uphold
the 1980 Refugee Act and stop deporting Central Americans.58 It is per-
haps not surprising that the government, and the INS in particular,
"poohpoohed sanctuary for two years as an irrelevant gesture . . . that
had a marginal impact at most on the INS task of protecting the nation's
borders and that would disappear when the novelty wore off." 9 And, the
Movement's momentum did slow down-but not until it had made quite
some impact in the intervening six years, not on INS border control activi-
ties, but on the lives of otherwise quite ordinary Americans.
As soon became apparent, though, the Sanctuary Movement had a po-
litical agenda, one that sought more than the mere honest application of
the Refugee Act. At a minimum, it "challenged American society to con-
front the disparity between law on the books and law in action," in recog-
nition of the fact that "law cannot be defined by formal rules or doctrines,
without regard for the way in which rules are interpreted and applied."6
It sought official acknowledgement of the linkage between economic and
political causes of misery in Central America and of the linkage between
American involvement in that region and refugee flight. And, as a right
based on international humanitarian laws like the Geneva Conventions 1
and on the sanctuary traditions of the Christian Church, the Sanctuary
Movement claimed the appropriateness of offering sanctuary to those
whom it deemed refugees under its reading of relevant law and moral
principle, at least until the government made the demanded acknowledge-
ments and reformed relevant law and policy. Sanctuary had moved from
charity to challenging the use of legalism to delegitimize the church's role
in political protest and to marginalize democratic participation in foreign
and asylum policymaking.
The government responded with its barrage of well-publicized argu-
ments about the illegality of Sanctuary, and by arresting and prosecuting
Sanctuary workers for harboring and transporting "illegal aliens" in vio-
lation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court battle had
begun.
But, at least in the context of political trials, battling in court is ulti-
mately little different from battling in Congress or on the soapbox. It still
involves either confronting or not confronting deeper issues. For instance,
58. Letter to William French Smith from the Rev. John M. Fife, dated March 23, 1982, cited in
MacEoin, supra note 1, at 21-22.
59. MacEoin, supra note 1, at 14, 23.
60. Helton, supra note 7, at 598.
61. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949 (Geneva Convention IV), in force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. In
conjunction with the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Internal Armed Conflicts, in force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/
144/Annex II (1977), Geneva Convention IV requires ratifying countries to give temporary refuge to
civilians fleeing internal armed conflict, prohibit their forced repatriation, and sanction private hu-
manitarian initiatives on their behalf. See Helton, supra note 7, at 512-13.
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why is the Refugee Act as vague as it is regarding who merits asylum, or
why could not the United States simultaneously certify Salvadorans as ref-
ugees and certify Duarte's regime as making human rights progress, or
whose voices should be heard in the foreign policymaking process. If past
American experience with institutional racism, intervention in Vietnam,
and other important issues are any guide, then it was the political nature
of the Sanctuary Movement that made it likely that the government and
the court would choose avoidance. But it was Sanctuary's character as an
intensely participation-oriented, socio-political movement which rendered
that avoidance hollow and irrelevant.
By the time of the prosecutions, it had become clear that a disjunction
in the discourse of the protest had opened up: The Sanctuary Movement
was no longer trying to directly influence the government. Rather, its
agenda had become as much participation in the transformative experi-
ence of adopting a new world view and ideology of response to world
events, as it was securing a safe haven for Central Americans. In other
words, while protesting government policy and policymaking certainly re-
mained one of the Movement's driving forces, their main goal had become
protesting from outside the dominant discourse. This was both the impli-
cation and the significance of the fact that Sanctuary participants had
found a new political voice in the course of hearing refugee stories and
deciding whether to commit themselves to offering Sanctuary.
Thus, the government had not only to confront or avoid Sanctuary's
challenges to its foreign and refugee policies in responding to the Move-
ment. It had also to either silence that new voice or control the process by
which that voice was being found. The government's first attempt to re-
spond to this aspect of the Sanctuary Movement was to try to persuade
the public that Sanctuary information and activity was misguided and
"political" in some pejorative sense of the term. As Elliott Abrams from
the State Department said:
[T]he militant activists, are really just opposing American policy
in El Salvador. I think they mislead many churchgoers . . . and
others in human rights groups . . . [into] thinking that there is some
horrendous 1930s-type situation and that if they don't act thousands
will die by the end of the week. I've seen some of the material that is
handed out by organizers to people in churches. It's horrendously
misleading stuff. It's the kind of stuff that would lead any sensible
person who reads it to jump into the sanctuary movement.6 2
Well, precisely. But trying to intimidate churchgoers by labelling as
62. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, April 9, 1984), cited in R. Golden
& M. McConnell, supra note 15, at 88-89.
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political their motives or those of their leaders was bound to be futile
when those people had already experienced political conscientization.
The government's follow-up response after its failure to regain the
moral and political high ground with respect to either the substance of the
policy issues involved or the process of criticizing policy was to try to
intimidate with silencing and terrorizing techniques. The employed tech-
niques were strikingly similar in their legal aspects, if not in the intensity
and frequency of their application, to those of the crass show trials under
totalitarian regimes. They included paying informers with seedy back-
grounds to infiltrate church meetings of both declared and potential sanc-
tuaries and prohibiting some Sanctuary defendants from discussing their
trials with even their pastors. The government did not resort to these tac-
tics out of any need for information or to protect the "fairness" of the
trials: Sanctuary was flauntingly public from the beginning. The govern-
ment could have gleaned almost any information about Sanctuary it de-
sired merely by asking Movement workers or reading their press releases
and writings. And fairness in terms of a bias-free jury could have been
secured by removing the cases to another, less involved area, while fair-
ness as experienced by the defendants, the supposed beneficiaries of a fair
trial, would have been better protected by more discussion. Rather, the
government needed and sought to secure its control of discursive fora and
practices from the threats of the newly acquired political voice and stri-
dent questioning involved in Sanctuary participation. But the Sanctuary
Movement was too decentralized: "[Ijt cannot be destroyed by chopping
off the heads of its leaders. The work goes on as usual even while those
indicted are in the dock."" Furthermore, Sanctuary was, "more than a
place. . . . [It was] a series of acts. . . . -of acts whose effects on
their actors could not be erased by criminal prosecution.
Given this impossibility of directly or effectively intimidating the new
world view represented and actualized by Sanctuary, the government tried
to control the presentation of that view in the courts to which it had forci-
bly tried to remove the debate about Sanctuary. In doing this, the govern-
ment was certainly both mindful of the "unavoidable ambiguity of [the
judge's] position as both defender of existing institutions and the guaran-
tor of their fairness, '"" and of such risks as jury sympathies for humble
church-going folk. Given that its political case was not airtight, the gov-
ernment had to "[tear] the incident from history," if it was to ensure at
least a legal victory for the existing configuration of political power and
opinion. In Kircheimer's words, the political risks were such that "[t]he
63. MacEoin, supra note 1, at 28. In fact, the selective prosecution of the Movement's leaders
may have caused a hero-martyr syndrome to surround the Movement and led to an increase in the
size and commitment of its membership. See Note, supra note 19, at 1440.
64. Napier, Hebraic Concepts of Sanctuary and Law, in Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 33.
65. 0. Kircheimer, supra note 10, at 176.
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symbolic value of the intrepid march into court [had to] be allowed to
stand for the actual battle in court." 66
This is the origin of the government's now famous motion in limine,67 a
motion unusual for the prosecuting side to use in the United
States-except in "political trials."68 In the Tucson trial, the motion
sought and obtained a prohibition on any mention before the jury of "in-
ternational law, the Refugee Act of 1980, religious conviction, events in El
Salvador or Guatemala, United States foreign policy, . . . stories of the
refugees fleeing persecution," United States immigration policy, or the po-
litical bias characterizing asylum statistics.69 The debate, as it was to be
presented in court, had been narrowed and recast in terms of the domi-
nant legalistic discourse: The only issue was whether the defendants had
harbored or transported undocumented foreigners. (A parallel tactic can
be seen in the Vietnam-era, conscientious objector cases, where the gov-
ernment managed to secure rulings that did not allow for any discussion
of the particular foreign policy and policymaking involved: The only issue
allowed to be discussed in court was whether the applicant for draft ex-
emption resisted fighting in all wars or only in Vietnam.)
The only hope for the Sanctuary defendants vis-a-vis this carefully
orchestrated attack on their activity was finding juries willing to convict
against the "evidence" (an option that the government had largely re-
moved from the Vietnam draftees by giving the Selective Service Board
jurisdiction over the conscientious objector cases). But as Corbett ex-
plained: "Many of us will probably serve some time in jail before we
reach the day when all juries impanelled to judge a sanctuary case will
know that they are deciding whether the violation of human rights by the
government necessitates sanctuary. '7' He was right. But that day of con-
scious and conscientious juries did not arrive in time: The guilty verdicts
rolled in. The Supreme Court refused, without comment, to reverse the
motion in limine and order a new trial allowing the presentation of a
further range of considerations to the jury. And the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has upheld the decisions in the group of Tucson cases against a
wide array of procedural challenges. 1
But by "winning" this battle, the U.S. government hardly won its war
66. Id. at 110, 116.
67. A "motion in limine" is a "written motion which is usually made before or after the begin-
ning of a jury trial for a protective order against prejudicial questions and statements." Black's Law
Dictionary 914 (5th ed. 1979); see Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases:
Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (1987) [hereinafter Politically Sensitive
Cases]; Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial without a Jury-A Government's Weapon Against the
Sanctuary Movement, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 5 (1986).
68. Colbert, Politically Sensitive Cases, supra.
69. R. Golden & M. McConnell, supra note 16, at 76.
70. Corbett, supra note 44, at 193.
71. See United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989), modified, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.
1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-6214 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1989).
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against the Sanctuary Movement. Its tactics of infiltration could not easily
disarm the sanctuary which the church offered as much to Movement par-
ticipants as to refugees. Its tactics only highlighted the impoverished per-
suasiveness of its substantive arguments about economic migrants and the
spread of communism in Central America. Once again, the tendency of
crass tactics to delegitimize further a government's viewpoint and thereby
its process for arriving at viewpoints was proved. Furthermore, the U.S.
government was facing a generation of people that had a tendency, once
the ordinary ideology they endorsed was cracked from without, to swing
quite wholeheartedly against the elites of that ideology and to view each
governmental effort to shore up its position as further evidence of its error,
illegitimacy, or complicity. As a result, the factual similarities between the
Vietnam War, the War at Home, and even Watergate, on the one hand,
and United States involvement in Central America, the Sanctuary Move-
ment, and the Iran-Contra Affair, on the other, could only reinforce the
government's fear of its own citizens and their suspicions of its "truths"
and its legitimacy.
III. CONCLUSION: EMPOWERMENT, POLITICAL JUSTICE,
AND SOCIO-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The Sanctuary Movement, however, did not "win" its conflict with the
government either. On one level, Salvadorans and Guatemalans continued
to be deported at approximately the same 99% rate as previously. There
was no referendum, however informal, on the issues surrounding Sanctu-
ary: We do not know whether the majority of Americans wanted to grant
asylum or temporary refugee to Central American refugees (as opposed to
Mexican migrant labor and undocumented workers). We do not even
know whether most federal officials endorsed the refugee policies and
practices they administered. "All we know is that these policies [were]
endorsed by the INS and by some people in the Reagan Administra-
tion-and that they [weren't] overruled by Congress" or the courts.
Sanctuary was never really about whether Central Americans are eco-
nomic or political refugees or about whether communism is encroaching in
the region. The real challenge from Sanctuary was not that the U.S. gov-
ernment's contentions on these issues might be disproved either factually
or logically. 3 The fundamental challenge came from Sanctuary's ability
to provide an alternative but logically complete and coherent world view
capable of offering at least as much intellectual and emotional satisfaction
as did the politically dominant view. At an even more fundamental level,
Sanctuary had a transformative potential for people who realized they
72. Nickel, Ethical Issues of the Influx of Central American Refugees into the United States, in
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 107.
73. R. Golden & M. McConnell, supra note 15, at 86.
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could view and interpret the world in alternative ways. In demystifying a
small part of the world, it enabled and encouraged them to see new pos-
sibilities, including possible new worlds.
But even using its own processes, Sanctuary failed to reach and con-
vince most Americans on the issue of Central America and the attractive-
ness of its practices. Even if it attracted well over two hundred churches
and synagogues, as well as many cities and a few states, most congrega-
tions never became sanctuaries and most Americans remained uninvolved;
many were hostile to Sanctuary out of disagreement with its politics, pre-
cisely because it was so political or perhaps because the mass media inter-
pretations of Sanctuary made them feel self-conscious about the religious
form of their political activism or the political form of their religious activ-
ism. In part, Sanctuary's dependence on confrontation limited the scope of
its transmissibility. The mass media was inevitably quite irrelevant for the
process of Sanctuary but, in the United States, reliance on the media is
unavoidable for reaching a large audience. More fundamentally, though,
the problem seems to have been, as Abrams foresaw, that the Movement
simply lost momentum. The explanations are diverse and interrelated:
They concern as much the difficulty of the work and the demands of par-
ticipation, as a host of other factors including the refocussing of American
attention onto the Iran-Contra Affair.
That the Movement has waned does not mean that it was not part of a
real threat to political justice. The waning of intense political phenomena
is a recurrent theme in the politics of protest in the United States. Charac-
teristically, this waning correlates with neither real nor even symbolic
concessions from elites, nor with government success in the political trials
usually heaved at those protest movements. On the contrary, the threat
and significance of Sanctuary survives its waning because its power re-
sides in its mobilization politics and its participatory style. As Kircheimer
writes:
Political claims eventually stand or fall on their own strength. A po-
litical trial might bring out and focus attention on areas of weakness
or strength of a political organization or a cause. Yet the authority
[or, as Shklar"4 would add, the legality] of the trial neither adds nor
detracts from the fundamental justification of such political claims,
namely, the justness of the cause.7 5
Like other similarly participatory movements which refuse both the
process and the discourse of the American polity's dominant legalism, the
Sanctuary Movement has done more than highlight the poverty of the
politics which the American government has pursued. Sanctuary has also
74. J. Shklar, supra note 14, at 150, 145.
75. 0. Kircheimer, supra note 10, at 430.
[Vol. 2: 381
32
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol2/iss2/7
1990]
empowered a few people. Perhaps not many, but nonetheless some. This
is both the majesty of Sanctuary and the source of its as yet still unreal-
ized link with the finest of the naming and proclaiming movements in
recent American history. This creation of an alternative political voice,
forum, and power, no matter how small relative to the enormity of the
dominant discourse, is also the source of its very significant threat to ex-
isting configurations of political power and process-to political justice
writ small. At this level, Sanctuary even eclipses notions of winnable po-
litical conflicts: Each empowered person is a "victory"-but more for her
own self than for Sanctuary or against the government.
This belonging to a tradition of empowerment, as opposed to protest or
charity, seems to have been only partially realized by Sanctuary Move-
ment participants. Corbett himself claims: "Initially, those of us involved
in sanctuary assumed that, as non-violent direct action that government
officials claim is unlawful, sanctuary is a variant of the civil disobedience
that matured in the practice and reflection of Thoreau, Gandhi, and
King." But "[m]isconceiving sanctuary as a variant form of civil disobedi-
ence blinded us to its actual dynamics as a socially constructive practice of
our faith."' 76 Such misconception, however, also blinds us to Sanctuary's
significant similarity with, for example, the Black Pride Movement, the
Indians at Wounded Knee,7 and the new socio-political movements of the
1980s in the United States, which focus on empowerment and on substan-
tive issues such as pornography, and subconscious and structural racism,
rather than on legally framed issues like "anti-discrimination," "equal
rights," and "due process".
Sanctuary, like the Civil Rights Movement, has shed light on the rela-
tive poverty of certain politics being pursued by the elites of the dominant
liberal discourse. In the Civil Rights movement, those espousing equality
for blacks won the moral, legal, and finally the political "high ground"; in
the Sanctuary Movement, those espousing asylum for Salvadorans and
non-intervention in Central American affairs possibly won the moral if
not the political or legal high grounds. When such high grounds are won,
the history of the dominant discourse usually seems to credit protest phe-
nomena for some impact on the actual politics pursued by the dominant
elite. But more important to tht Movements and the realization of their
goals is how it is channelled and limited.
The Civil Rights Movement, for example, was co-opted by the (now)
dominant discourse of legalism: Mostly white, mostly male liberals, as a
tacit price for their support, took control of much of the Movement's pro-
cess-from the legal fights in Congress and the courts to organizing dem-
76. Corbett, supra note 44, at 189. But see Coffin, supra note 41, at 181.
77. Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil Disobedience, 18 Geo.
L. Rev. 929, 962 (1984).
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onstrations and fundraising-and its substance-from what objectives and
concessions would be fought for, to the decision to rely on liberal "rights"
of individual equality to eliminate discrimination. Today, twenty years
after the new civil rights acts and anti-discrimination court decisions,
blacks have "equality before the law" but neither laws for equality nor
equal access to the law; they have "equal opportunity" but no equal ac-
cess to opportunity. The real significance of the Civil Rights Movement
cannot (yet) be found in any full substantiation of rights for minorities.
Rather, its significance seems to reside more in the disillusionment of
many minorities with relying on the courts, Congress, and localities to
implement and enforce rights with legalism and liberalism.78
Many of the early Sanctuary workers were cognizant of these civil
rights experiences, and some even took active part in the Civil Rights
movement. They saw similar phenomena occurring in the refugee and for-
eign aid areas. For them, Sanctuary was or quickly became a manifesta-
tion of their refusal to trust the government: They trusted neither the INS
nor the courts to protect Central American refugees by adequately ad-
ministering deportation laws. Nor did they trust the State Department to
report accurately on Central American human rights conditions, for to do
so would constrain its foreign policy objectives.
The Civil Rights Movement's legacy of disillusionment, however, ex-
tends beyond frustration with the manipulability and hollowness of liberal
legalism and the concomitant distrust of the government it often engen-
ders. The legacy also includes concern for the protection and empower-
ment of a movement's workers and beneficiaries. An important aspect of
the Civil Rights era for many blacks was the sense of empowerment they
granted themselves through their own processes of constructing a coherent
world view and living it flagrantly in the midst of both the Ku Klux Klan
and white liberalism. 9 Similar dynamics of conscientization and emphasis
on self-empowerment characterize the new black consciousness, feminism,
gay pride, and other socio-political movements of the 1980s. The Sanctu-
ary Movement, like these other movements, is rooted in and uses small,
protected fora to allow and encourage people to assert and name their
experiences and concerns. It, too, is about controlling meaning in an envi-
ronment in which the loss of such control to the dogmas of liberalism and
legalism in the 1960s and 1970s subverted the substantive realization of
the goals of the Civil Rights and other movements. Sanctuary involved
"doing sanctuary . . . . [Part] of the process of doing sanctuary . . . was
proclaiming or declaring" 8'-including proclaiming the very right to pro-
claim and act upon new world views and alternative moralities.
78. But, as some Critical Legal Studies scholars sometimes overlook, disillusionment with legalism
and liberalism is different from disillusionment with the rule of law or with liberty.
79. See Olsen, supra note 77, at 962.
80. Murphy, A Historical View of Sanctuary, in Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 78-79.
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The significance of this naming activity resides in the fact that control
over meaning is power in a legalistic media-dominated society. At a crude
level, if you have to secure your rights by presenting a claim in court, you
can only prevail if the court-given meaning of that right and your claimed
deprivation mesh: If you are a refugee, the reasons for your flight and fear
must fit into the "political persecution" box or you will likely face depor-
tation as an economic migrant. If you are a Sanctuary worker, your rea-
sons for harboring "illegal aliens" must fit the court's definition of "ne-
cessity" or you will likely find yourself a convicted criminal. But control
over meaning can also yield power: Even if Sanctuary did not succeed at
controlling meaning in the INS and judicial fora, it did control it in its
own fora against the onslaught of disparagement and alternative views
offered by the government and media. And in so doing it created and
controlled a source of power and political significance.
In evaluating the scope and significance of the Sanctuary Movement, it
is thus not critical that some of the people who considered sanctuary
"never [got] to the point of proclaiming or declaring."'" They at least had
the opportunity to hear the testimony of refugees and witness the process
of Sanctuary-to hear and witness Sanctuary's self-empowered, but other-
wise ordinary (i.e., non-elite) folk. But, self-empowerment is precisely
what legalistic political justice cannot tolerate. The problem is not just
that self-empowerment usually entails a thoroughgoing critique of the ide-
ology and processes constituting the existing system of political justice.
Nor is it just that the system has been named as or shown to be less than
just, as less than Political Justice writ large. Rather, the main problems
are that the empowerment that accompanies that naming creates a pocket
of anarchy-a rupture in political justice-because it carries with it the
power to cause at least some others to accept the new reality, as well as
the power for its adherents to know their own power and apply or find it
in other areas of socio-political life.
It is both to the existence of such ruptures and to the responses of polit-
ical elites that extraordinary legal procedures of prosecutorial motions in
limine and government infiltrations of church meetings orient our atten-
tion. They demand that we examine the fiber of our polity to see why
such ruptures have occurred; to decide whether they should be cauterized,
woven back into the socio-political fabric, or allowed to proceed further;
and to determine whether the motives and means used by those seeking to
stem or mend the ruptures should be accepted.
Bearing this focus in mind and the foregoing examination of the origins
of the Sanctuary Movement, it is possible to contribute the following to
the more standard accounts and analyses of Sanctuary that emphasize the
81. d. at 79.
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religiosity of its motivation and the illegality of its tactics: It is a phenome-
non involving the conscientized empowerment of a few Americans who
can now pierce the veils of liberalism, legalism, and mass media informa-
tion and who have found a voice to name and proclaim what they find
behind these veils. The Sanctuary Movement presented a threat to the
status quo policies and practices concerning refugees, information evalua-
tion, and democratic participation, particularly in foreign policymaking.
As Shklar and Kircheimer appreciate, this aspect of the Movement's
threat explains why its participants were tried criminally, and why their
trials were political trials. But the fact that the Sanctuary Movement
could not be silenced suggests that such political trials do not succeed in
reestablishing control over the substance and processes of Political Jus-
tice-over "justice in political matters." ' The ruptures caused by par-
ticipatory movements always leave a residue of self-empowerment. This
self-empowerment may not remain intensely activated and impassioned at
all times, but neither is it easily eradicated.
It is the resilience of this self-empowerment, and not just the poverty of
the politics being pursued or the crassness of the tactics used, which ex-
plains the ultimate unease with which we view political trials or pro-
nounce their "success" or failure. In fact, all political trials seem ulti-
mately to go down in history as failures, themselves as ruptures in
political justice. The Sanctuary trials have yet to go down in history, but
the story of their origins, at least when interpreted as the text for a politi-
cal trial, makes it seem unlikely that the U. S. government will be able to
disempower either the Sanctuary workers practicing the ideology of a
transformed world view, or the refugees and their brothers and sisters in
Central America. With this understood, perhaps now we can allow the
Sanctuary Movement to proclaim its religiosity and understand what it
thereby means. Perhaps now we can respond to the red flags of motions in
limine, retrial denials, and deportation statistics. Perhaps now we can
evaluate the "quality of the politics being pursued" by the Sanctuary
Movement and the U.S. government, both in Central America and at
home.
82. See 0. Kircheimer, supra note 10, at vii.
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